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Abstract
In an economic geography model where both a negative pecuniary and a positive tech 
nological externality are present, we introduce an explicit dynamics of  rms locational
choice and we characterize its long run distribution. Our analysis shows that economic
activities evenly distribute when the pecuniary externalities prevail, and agglomerate
otherwise. Due to the stochastic nature of the dynamics, even when agglomeration oc 
curs, it is only a metastable state. By giving time and  rms heterogeneity a role, we are
bringing the evolutionary approach inside the domain of economic geography.
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11 Introduction
The present contribution intends to pursue the analysis of the e ects of the evolutionary
metaphor (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman, 1986; Dosi, 1988) when applied inside the
domain of economic geography. In principle, the validity of the assumption of evolutionary
economics is all but obvious and the question whether economic interactions can be e ectively
thought as an evolutionary process still open. With the clear risk of oversimplifying the
matter, we could say that the notion of evolution immediately entails three consequences
for the economic dynamics. First, it should move from simpler to more complex structures.
Second, it should progressively eliminate less e cient structures and promote the development
of more e cient ones, irrespectively of the fact that this process of elimination and promotion
might take place through a mechanism of adaptation by part of the economic actors or through
an“adoptation” by part of markets and institutions (Alchian, 1950). Third, the progressive
change or renewal of the di erent actors and rules should proceed in a jointly integrated way.
Obviously, the central question is not whether the characteristics described above can be
considered to be present in economic systems, because they certainly are. The question is
whether the evolutionary accounting of their e ects and causes allows for a deeper under 
standing and a more reliable modeling of economic interactions. In the end, one is interested
to know if this accounting could help in the development of more e ective policies. In principle,
however, the ideas of evolutionary economic thinking can be applied to the investigation of the
di erent domains of economics also without providing a certain and indisputable answer to
the previous question. Indeed, partly following, even if not subscribing to, the Friedmanian’s
idea that the e ectiveness of a theoretical framework should be solely judged on its ability to
reproduce and explain observed phenomena, one could simply start from the “evolutionary”
metaphor and see what consequences it brings to the design of economic models. As argued
in Frenken and Boschma (2007), the development of an evolutionary approach to economic
geography could suggest new ways of explaining the observed patterns which characterize the
uneven spatial distribution of economic activities. In the spirit of the foregoing “minimalis 
tic” research agenda, we try to complement the bottom up theorizing suggested there with
a deeper understanding of the di erences that an evolutionary inspired modeling is likely to
produce with respect to more traditional approaches.
To be brought to its completion our exercise requires a twofold speci cation. First, we need
to identify a simple formal model, based on clear assumptions, which can serve as a generic
analytical framework. Second, we have to consider which hypotheses are to be put forward in
order to imbue this model with the spirit of the Evolutionary Economic Geography. We address
the  rst requirement by choosing, as a starting point, the simple two location and multi  rm
model described in Krugman (1991). This model already encompasses the idea of increasing
returns and of the relevance of feed back mechanisms in shaping the aggregate economic
pattern. It is well rooted in the tradition of New Economic Geography and, as such, constitutes
a perfect benchmark for our comparative exercise. Concerning the second requirement, in line
with the discussion in Boschma and Frenken (2006) and Boschma and Martin (2007), and
partly inspired by the critical survey in Martin (1999), we assume the following three aspects
as baseline characters of our evolutionary modeling. First, the interaction between economic
agents should take place not only through market mechanisms, but also through localized,
idiosyncratic interactions. Second, the  ow of time should be present in the model and the
decisions of economic agents, together with their consequences, should be put in an explicit
time dimension. Third, the heterogeneity of  rms behaviour should not be captured by a
simple “noise” term acting as a perturbation around a deterministic equilibrium. Rather, it
2should enter as an essential ingredient in the description of the model and in the determination
of the  nal aggregate outcome (Schelling, 1978; Granovetter, 1978).
More precisely, we take as a starting point the model introduced in Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) and developed in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008). The latter extends Krugman (1991) by
introducing a positive technological externality, assumed not tradable across locations, and by
considering workers who are not mobile, which is equivalent to assume that  rms locational
decision and reallocation of capital goods take place on a much shorter time scale than the
one characterizing work force  ows. Inside this simple economy, we consider a heterogeneous
population of pro t maximizing  rms which independently choose where to locate their pro 
duction. The model is characterized by a simple entry exit process, and we consider a truly
dynamic setting in which the locational decision of each  rm is a ected by the past decisions
of others. As in Bottazzi et al. (2007), we assume that  rms keep revising their decisions as
new locational choices a ect their pro ts. As we shall see this updating choice process is able
to generate a self reinforcement mechanism similar to that described in Dosi and Kaniovski
(1994).
The idea that localized externalities might explain agglomeration even in absence of workers
mobility, has been explored by several contributions inside the New Economic Geography lit 
erature. For instance Krugman and Venables (1996) assume a vertically structured economy
with localized input output linkages while Martin and Ottaviano (1999) consider location 
speci c R&D sectors which introduce di erent products in di erent locations. Baldwin and
Forslid (2000) consider geographical distributions of economic activities as driven by a growth
process fueled by human capital accumulation and knowledge spillovers. A drawback of these
works is that, in general, they derive equilibria conditions without the complete and explicit
characterization of  rms pro t functions. This speci cation becomes however necessary when
one has to design the choice procedure of  rms in a dynamic environment. In order to obtain
explicit expression for the pro t function, we take a simpler approach: we introduce techno 
logical externalities in the forms of a baseline “cost sharing” assumption, according to which
 xed production costs are shared across all  rms within a given location.
The cost sharing assumption makes the model in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) particularly
suitable for the present exercise because, while remaining simple and analytically tractable,
it allows for a twofold dependence of  rm pro ts on the activity of the other  rms. Using
the terminology of Scitovsky (1954), this dependence takes the form of both a pecuniary
externality and a technological externality. In this way,  rms pro ts depend on the interplay of
an indirect interaction mediated by the market, which corresponds to a pecuniary externality,
and a localized direct interaction, which corresponds to a technological externality. As it
turns out, the former acts against the creation of production clusters while, by assumption,
the latter promotes them.
Inside this framework, we analyze an explicit  rms locational decision process. Our aim is
to characterize the long run geographical distribution emerging from this process and relate
it to the interplay of the two forms of externality. Since we explicitly introduce the time
dimension in our analysis, we are also able to address history dependent phenomena. In
particular, we are able to investigate how the initial state of the economy a ects  rms decisions
and show that, due to  rms heterogeneity, when agglomeration occurs it is characterized by a
transient nature.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie y describe the model and its
assumptions. In Section 3 we study the static setting, and derive the geographical distribu 
tion when the model is solved by assuming instantaneous equilibrium between  rms choices.
Starting from the previously identi ed equilibria, Section 4 introduces both heterogeneity in
3agents decisions and an explicit dynamics across time, discussing what kind of di erences are
observed with respect to the static case. Finally Section 5 summarizes our main  ndings and
suggests some possible further developments.
2 The model
The following model is a simpli cation of that described in Bottazzi and Dindo (2008), where
more details can be found. Consider a two locations economy. In each location there live I
households.1 Each household is a “local” worker, that is, he supplies labour to  rms located
where he resides, and a “global” consumer, that is, he can buy goods produced in both locations
and traded in a global market. The economy has two sectors: manufacturing and agriculture.
In both sectors production is localized. The agricultural good is homogeneous whereas the
manufacturing good is made by di erentiated products. Location l = 1,2 has nl manufacturing
 rms and the total number of  rms is n1+n2 = N. Without loss of generality, we assume that
N is even. In order to consume manufacturing goods produced in the location where they do
not reside, consumers have to pay a transportation cost τ ∈ (0,1] which takes the form of an
iceberg cost: for each unit of good shipped, only a fraction τ arrives at destination. This is
equivalent to say that consumers pay a price p/τ for each unit of good they have to import.
The higher the value of τ, the lower the cost of transporting goods. Agricultural goods are
traded at no costs. Agents consumption behavior is speci ed by the following
Assumption 1. Each agent chooses among the agricultural good and the N di erent manu 

















σ > 1, (2.2)
and each product ci is produced by a di erent  rm i = 1,...,N.
Assumption 1 implies that the N products are substitutes and that σ is the mutual elas 
ticity of substitution (cfr. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). The higher σ, the more the products
are substitutes and the more price di erences impact consumers demand. Since, due to CES
utility, agents value diversity, we have implicitly assumed that each  rm produces a di erent
product, so that N is both the number of manufacturing  rms and the number of manufac 
turing products available for consumption.
The agricultural sector uses only labour as input under constant returns to scale with
unitary marginal costs. Due to the large number of potential producers, 2I(1 − µ) at equilib 
rium, the agricultural market is perfectly competitive and the agricultural good is sold at its
marginal cost.
Also manufacturing  rms use only labor as input and their technologies are characterized by
a common, industry speci c, marginal cost and a local, location speci c,  xed cost. Formally
one has
1The generalization to di erent number of agents in each location will be considered in future work. Pre 
liminary analysis shows that it doesn’t signi cantly modify the results.
4Assumption 2. The labour vi that each  rm i = 1,...,N needs to produce an amount yi of
output is given by
vi = βyi + αli , (2.3)
where marginal cost β is constant across  rms and across locations and the  xed costs αli
depend on the location li occupied by  rm i.
Assumption 2 implies that we are in presence of economies of scale, that is, an increase in
output causes a decrease in each  rm average costs. Firm i pro t is given by
πi = piyi − wivi = yi(pi − wiβ) − wiαli , i = 1,...,N (2.4)
where wi is  rm i cost of labour.
Before looking for markets equilibria notice that, due to perfect competition and constant
returns to scale in agricultural production, agricultural wages are equal to agricultural prices.
Moreover, due to zero transportation costs for the agricultural goods, agricultural prices, and
thus wages, must be the same in both locations. Given that consumers are not mobile and
the economy is at an equilibrium, it should be also indi erent for a worker to work in the
agricultural or in the manufacturing sector. As a result wages in the two sectors, and in the
two locations, are equal. For this reason it is convenient to use wages to normalizes prices in
the economy and set wi = 1 for all i.
In order to  nd equilibrium prices, quantities, pro ts in the manufacturing sector, and
the resulting geographical distribution of  rms, one should in principle analyze each of the
N product markets. Nevertheless the problem can be simpli ed by considering only one
representative market for each location. In fact, location by location,  rms produce using
the same technology, face the same demand (due to Assumption 1 all goods are substitutes),
and the same labour supply. This implies that equilibrium prices, quantities and wages are
the same for all the  rms in a given location. We can thus consider only two representative
product markets, one for each location l, rather than the N distinct products.
We shall compute market equilibrium prices, quantities, and pro ts for each  xed distri 
bution of  rms, that is,  xing n1 and n2. First, exploiting the CES preference structure (2.2),
which gives a constant elasticity of demand, and assuming that the market structure is that
of monopolistic competition, we derive  rms pricing behavior. Then using households budget
constraints we compute their total demand for the goods produced in each location, taking
into account that all goods are substitutes and transportation costs impact the prices of for 
eign goods. Setting supply equal to demand we are able to determine equilibrium quantities
and  rms pro ts in each location as a function of n1 and n2. These expressions will be used,
in the next section, to asses  rms geographical distribution.
Let us start from  rms pricing behavior. Consistently with our assumptions, the market
structure is that of monopolistic competition, that is, each  rm maximizes its pro ts, setting
its marginal revenue equal to its marginal costs, given market demand elasticity and irrespec 
tively of other  rms behavior. Using pro t function (2.4) and substituting (2.3) while setting







= β , (2.5)
where ε = ∂ logc/∂ logp is the demand elasticity. Given Assumption 1, it holds that
ε = −σ,





Since the price does not depend on the location index, local prices are equal and it it holds
p1 = p2.
Denote the quantity demanded by an agent who reside in location l of a product produced
in location m as dlm. Each demand can be determined as a function of prices and wages using





























where, given the Cobb Douglas formulation in (2.1), µ is the share of agents (unitary) income


























Equating, location by location,  rms supply and consumers demand, gives

   
   
y1 = Id11 +
Id21
τ





where τ discounts the demand of imported goods. Plugging (2.9) in (2.10) and using (2.6)
one can solve for market equilibrium quantities

    





















Pro ts in each location can now be found using the latter expression together with (2.4) and
(2.6). Introducing the fraction of  rms in location 1, x = n1/N (so that n2 = (1 − x)N), and
normalizing the level of wages to one, pro ts can be  nally written as a function of x

    
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6Each location speci c pro t function in (2.12) has a positive term proportional to the total
demand for good produced in that location and a negative term equal to the location speci c
 xed costs. In turn, the total demand has a domestic component,  rst term in parenthesis,
and an import component, second term in parenthesis. Both components depend on  rms
geographical distribution and transportation costs. When transportation cost is zero, τ = 1,
they are equal irrespectively of  rms distribution. When transportation cost increases, the
domestic component increases, as local consumers substitute foreign goods with local ones. For
the same reason, the export component decreases. For any given positive transportation cost,
when local  rm concentration increases, the local component decreases as agents have more
local goods to consume, all at the same price. In the same situation the export component
increases, because foreign consumers have less local goods to consume and  nd convenient
to import more. The net e ects of the transportation cost on the relative pro ts of the two
locations are appraised in the next section. However, even without knowing this e ect, it is
immediate to see that market forces make the average pro ts independent on transportation
costs. Indeed one has the following
Proposition 2.1. Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2, and N  rms, where
Assumptions 1 2 are valid. Then the average  rms pro t   π does not depend on transportation
costs and is given by
  π =
2Iµ
Nσ
− xα1 − (1 − x)α2 . (2.13)
Proof. See Appendix.
If now one assumes that α1 = α2, since location speci c indexes have disappeared from
any variable, only market forces are at work and our model becomes close to the one of Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003). Following Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) we take a di erent route.
Before doing so, a last remark is necessary concerning the general equilibrium setting. In
our framework labour and goods markets are at equilibrium only when total  rms pro ts
are zero, and only provided that the demand for labour in both locations is not higher than
I. Concerning the former condition, notice that pro ts are already zero for the competitive
agricultural  rms but not necessarily so for manufacturing  rms. Nevertheless it is possible to
set zero pro t for the manufacturing sector imposing a long run equilibrium condition on the
size of the economy. We shall do so in Assumption 4 below. Concerning the latter condition one
has that, due to labour market segmentation (no mobility), labour demand in both locations
should be lower than I. Straightforward computations show that this amounts to impose a
restriction on the preferences for manufacturing goods, namely µ < σ/(2σ −1), which we will
assume to hold from now on.2 As a result, provided that preferences for manufacturing goods
are not too strong and upon imposing a long run zero pro t condition on the number of  rms,
prices and quantities as in (2.6) and (2.11) guarantee that both labour and good markets are
at equilibrium.
2.1 Technological externalities
By retaining a dependency of the  xed cost α on the location index, we introduce a localized
technological externality due to direct  rms interaction, that is, not mediated by market forces
2This is the same condition found in e.g. Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). See Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) for
more details.
7(Scitovsky, 1954).
Assumption 3. “Cost sharing” hypothesis. Firms  xed costs αl decreases with the number




, where xl =
nl
N
,l ∈ {0,1}. (2.14)
Assumption 3 represents a positive technological externality in the form of a baseline “cost
sharing”: the larger the number of  rms in one location, the lower the  xed costs these
 rms bear in the production activity. Since the  xed cost payed by  rms in a given location
decreases proportionally with the number of  rms populating that location, the total  xed
cost payed remains, location by location, constant. This e ect can be thought as an up front
cost payed to improve access to skilled labour, the more  rms in one location the smaller each
 rm investment in training, or as a cost for services or infrastructure use, which are evenly
shared among all the active  rms in one location.
An important feature of the speci c form of “cost sharing” introduced in Assumption 3 is
that it doesn’t modify the total  xed costs payed by the industry. This has consequences on
the computation of  rms average pro t.
Corollary 2.1. Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2, and N  rms, where As 
sumptions 1 3 are valid. Total  xed costs in each location are equal to αN/2. The average
 rms pro t   π does not depend neither on  rms distribution x nor on transportation cost τ and
is given by





Before we start to look for geographical equilibria, that is, those spatial distributions of
 rms where they have no incentives to change location, notice that, without restrictions on
the parameters values, there could exist economies characterized by negative pro ts. In this
case, we would expect  rms to exit the economy. On the other hand, if pro ts were positive we
could expect  rms to enter the economy. As we consider the number of  rms N in the model
as given, if there are not barriers to entry, it seems reasonable to set the number N to a level
which implies zero pro ts. By force of Corollary 2.1 this can be done also without knowing
the geographical equilibrium distribution. Indeed pro ts at a geographical equilibrium must
be equal to average pro ts and average pro ts (2.15), due to Corollary 2.1, are independent
on the geographical distribution x. Moreover, as we have explained at the end of the previous
subsection, zero total pro ts are needed in order to guarantee that all markets are at an
equilibrium. All together, it is enough to have the following






8Even if, by construction, the previous assumption implies   π = 0, outside the geographi 
cal equilibrium pro ts can be both positive or negative so that their di erential gives  rms
the incentive to relocate. Before moving to the analysis of these incentives and to the char 
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Given the  rms production costs α, the products elasticity of substitution σ and the trans 
portation cost τ, the distribution of  rms between the two locations, x, determines, through
(2.17), the levels of pro t. Notice that in (2.17), di erently from (2.12), both the demand
driven term and the  xed cost term are functions of the geographical distribution of  rms.
The  rst dependence is mediated by market forces (pecuniary externality) whereas the second
dependence is brought in by the “cost sharing” hypothesis (technological externality).
3 Geographical equilibria
In this section we investigate the static geographical equilibria of the system, that is, those
distributions of  rms x such that, in the search for higher pro ts, each  rm located in 1 has no
incentives to move to 2 and vice versa. Geographical equilibria can be of two types: “border”
equilibria and “interior” equilibria. A border equilibrium occurs when  rms concentrate in one
location, say 1, and pro ts in 1 are higher than pro ts in 2. As all the  rms are in 1, no other
 rm can respond to this di erence in pro t opportunities. Candidates for border equilibria
are x = 1, when all  rms are in 1, and x = 0, when all  rms are in 2. Conversely, an interior
equilibrium occurs when  rms distribute among the two locations, that is x ∈ (0,1), pro t
levels are equal in both regions, and  rms do not have any incentive to change their location.
Using pro ts in (2.17) we will derive results for the existence and uniqueness of geographical
equilibria, border and interior, for all the di erent parameterizations of the economy. This
static3 analysis, which owes considerably to Bottazzi and Dindo (2008) where more details can
be found, is useful to understand the interplay of pecuniary and technological externalities
and constitutes an useful step for the development of the evolutionary dynamic analysis of the
next section.
The respective role of each externality in determining pro t di erentials and thus the ag 
gregate geographical equilibrium can be judged by looking at the shape of the pro t functions
and by keeping in mind that, due to transportation costs, local prices are lower than for 
eign prices, and thus local demand impacts  rms level of output more than foreign demand.
Consider the pecuniary externality term alone, e.g. sets α = 0 in (2.17). For de niteness,
consider pro ts in 1 (results for pro ts in 2 follows in the same way). For small x, that is,
few  rms in location 1 and many  rms in location 2, each  rm in 1 faces a high local de 
mand and a low foreign demand. Due to the di erent impact of local and foreign demand,
the level of output of  rms in 1 is high and pro ts are high too. As x increases, the local
demand for these  rms decreases, so that pro ts decrease too. As the concentration of  rms
3Technically our geographical equilibrium corresponds to a Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies of the one
shot game where each  rm in a group of N has to chose whether to be located in 1 or in 2 and payo s are
given by pro ts.
9in 1 increases further, for su ciently large value of x, the demand coming from the consumers
in 2, where very few  rms are left, is more and more directed to 1 and the pro ts of  rms
located in 1 increase again. Pro ts are thus U shaped, with π1(x)|α=0  rst decreasing and
then increasing in x. Since a  rm makes the most pro ts when alone in one location, we
have π1(x = 0)|α=0 > π1(x = 1)|α=0 so that the border distributions 0 and 1 are never an
equilibrium. In fact, when all  rm are located in one region is always more pro table to move
to the other region. It the transportation cost is increased (decreased) the variation of pro ts
as a function of x is more (less) pronounced but the general shape of the pro t function is
preserved. As a result, the overall agglomeration e ect of the pecuniary externality is always
“negative”, in the sense that it works against concentration of production.
The above picture changes completely when one considers also the technological external 
ity terms introduced by the “cost sharing” assumption, i.e. α > 0 in (2.17). The panels in
Fig. 1 show graphs of π1(x) and π2(x) in this case. Pro ts are given by the superposition of a
monotonically increasing technological externality to the U shaped market driven pecuniary
externality term. With low transportation costs (high τ) the pro t function is essentially de 
termined by the “cost sharing” term and is monotonically increasing with decreasing marginal
pro ts (upper panels of Fig. 1). In this case, when  rms concentration is low,  rms do not
bene t from the technological externality and their pro ts are low too, but when concentra 
tion increases, pro ts increase monotonically as  rms exploit the “cost sharing” opportunity.
The more the  rms in one location, the lower the positive contribution of an extra  rm lo 
cating there, so that the marginal pro t decreases. With high transportation costs (low τ)
the shape of the pro t function is still monotonic (bottom panels of Fig. 1), but marginal
pro ts are  rst decreasing and then increasing. With low  rm concentration the technological
externality dominates and marginal pro ts are decreasing. As the concentration increases, the
positive e ect of the cost sharing is almost o set by the negative market interaction, which
acts as a constraint on the local demand faced by  rms. In this case, even if pro ts are still
increasing the marginal pro t is almost zero. As the concentration of  rms increases further,
pro ts increase more steadily because low local demand is now compensated by the foreign
demand, so that the contribution of the pecuniary externality is positive too. Judging from
Fig. 1, irrespectively of the transportation costs, the positive e ect of technological external 
ities is dominating the negative e ect of pecuniary externalities:  rms make most pro ts by
agglomerating on one side and border distributions are always equilibria. This is formalized
in
Proposition 3.1. Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2 where Assumptions 1 4
are valid. Call x the fraction of  rms located in 1. There always exists two, and only two,
geographical equilibria given by the border distribution x∗
1 = 1 and x∗
0 = 0. In particular, the
unique distribution where pro ts are equal, x∗ = 0.5, is never an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to the previous proposition, the distribution with half of the  rms located in
1 and the other half located in 2, which is the unique case where π1 = π2, is never a geo 
graphical equilibrium: even if pro ts are equal, incentives are such that  rms move away and
agglomerate. Only when all  rms are located either in 1 or 2 there are no incentives to change
location.
Notice that, even if transportation costs do a ect the shape of each location pro t function,









































Figure 1: Location pro ts (2.17) as a function of  rms geographical distribution for di erent
values of the transportation cost τ. Other parameters are σ = 4 and α = 1.
as we shall see in the following section, transportation costs will play a major role in shaping
the results of the evolutionary model, even in the long run.
4 Evolutionary  rm dynamics
In the previous section we have shown that, when the technological externality term is intro 
duced,  rms agglomerate in one of the two locations, irrespectively of transportation costs τ
or the relevance of technological spillover as dependent on α. This abrupt behaviour would
prescribe that any sector in which even a minimal level of localized non pecuniary externali 
ties operate should display a so called core periphery structure. This is clearly at odds with
empirical observations. Notice that this conclusion would remain a fortiori valid if instead we
had considered workers mobility with endogenous wage setting, thus introducing a feed back
e ect which reduces (or inverts) the push of pecuniary externalities towards a symmetric ge 
ographical distribution. This e ect ultimately reinforces the conclusion that in presence of
technological spillovers only a core periphery structure represents an equilibrium. We end up
in the uncomfortable situation of having a single possible equilibrium, implying the impossi 
bility of performing empirical analysis or to derive policy implication. A possible way out from
this impasse, as we will show, is to extend the notion of geographical equilibrium to include
an explicit dynamics describing  rms locational decisions. The foregoing analysis is, indeed,
11essentially static and thus silent on the results of  rms interactions out of equilibrium. As a
consequence, it is not clear what happens when the initial concentration of  rms is not at an
equilibrium level, in particular, whether one should expect  rms to agglomerate in location 1
or in location 2.
In this section we extend our analysis by introducing heterogeneity in preferences at the
single  rm level and by explicitly modeling  rms decisions in time, that is, by allowing for a
dynamic location selection mechanism. Suppose that the individual utility of  rm i derived
from locating in li can be written as
πi = πli + ei,li (4.1)
where πli are as in (2.17) and ei,li represents an idiosyncratic pro t component intended to
capture  rm speci c characteristics, like di erences in productive e ciency leading to di erent
 xed costs or individual preferences for one particular location, due, for instance, to existing
social linkages. At every time step a  rm is randomly chosen to exit the economy. At the
same time a new  rm enters and chooses whether to be located in 1 or in 2 by comparing
the individual utilities in (4.1). As long as the distribution of ei,l across  rms is well behaved
(cfr. Bottazzi and Secchi, 2007; Bottazzi et al., 2007, for details) the resulting probability of
choosing l is given by
Probl =
eπl
eπ1 + eπ2 , l ∈ {1,2}. (4.2)
The fact that the locational choice is probabilistic derives from the assumption that the new
entrant possesses preferences, or faces costs, which are not  xed, but contain an individual
component which is randomly extracted from a given distribution.
When the probability of choosing location l is given by (4.2), Bottazzi and Secchi (2007)
show that, if the exponentials of pro ts are linearly changing in the number of  rms, it is
possible to compute the long run stationary distribution of the entry exit process. Thus, to
exploit this result we need a linearized version of the exponential pro t functions. We can
naturally obtain it as deviation from the middle point x∗ = 0.5, that is, the unique point
where pro ts are equal.
Proposition 4.1. Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2, where Assumptions 1 4
are valid. Denote the linearization of location l exponential pro ts around x∗ = 0.5 as cl, and
the number of  rms in location l as nl. Linearized exponential pro ts are given by
cl = a + bnl , l = 1,2, (4.3)
where
a = 1 −
4ατσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2 ,
b =
4α2στσ−1
Iµ(1 + τσ−1)2 .
(4.4)
Proof. See Appendix.
We shall call the term a in (4.4) the “intrinsic pro t”. This is the part of the common pro t
which is entirely dependent on exogenously given characteristics of the location. Conversely,
12the coe cient b in (4.4) captures the marginal contribution of a  rm to the pro t level of the
location in which it resides. We shall call it the “marginal pro t”.4 In our case, this coe cient
captures the total e ect of pecuniary and technological externalities. Due to the leading e ect
of the latter it is always positive but, due to the presence of market mediated interactions, it
is dependent on transportation costs. Speci cally, the marginal pro t is increasing with the
value of τ. When transportation costs are high (low τ) each  rm marginal contribution to
the location pro t is small, whereas when transportation costs are low (high τ) the marginal
contribution is large.
Given the linearization in 4.3, the following proposition characterizes the long run geo 
graphical equilibrium distribution.
Proposition 4.2. Consider an economy with two locations, l = 1,2, where Assumptions 1 4
are valid. The economy is populated by N  rms, distributed according to n = (n1,n2). At
the beginning of each period of time a  rm is randomly selected, with equal probability over
the entire population, to exit the economy. Let m ∈ {1,2} be the location a ected by this exit.
After exit takes place, a new  rm enters the economy and, conditional on the exit occurred in
m, has a probability
Probl =
a + b(nl − δl,m)
2a + bN



















   n
h=1[a + b(h − 1)] n > 0
1 n = 0 (4.7)
and Z(N,a,b) is a normalization factor which depends only on the total number of  rms N,
and the coe cients a and b.
Proof. See Propositions 3.1 − 3.4 of Bottazzi and Secchi (2007).
Figure 2 shows results from a simulation of the entry exit process for two di erent values
of the transportation cost τ. The left panel shows 50000 iterations of the process, whereas the
right panel plots the corresponding long run distributions as characterized by Proposition 4.2.
With low transportation costs (τ = 0.95) the long run distribution is clustered around the
two extreme values, x = 0 and x = 1, con rming the prediction of the static analysis. However,
the simulation of the entry exit process (left panel of Fig. 2) shows that agglomeration is only a
meta stable state. One location can become much larger than the other for several time steps,
like location 2 which, in the simulation shown, attracts almost all  rms in the periods between
2000 and 3500, but at some point the cluster abruptly disappears and the other location can
4In the terminology of Bottazzi and Secchi (2007) the intrinsic pro t corresponds to the location “intrinsic
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Figure 2: Entry exit process for di erent values of the transportation costs. Left panel.
50000 simulations of the entry exit process for di erent values of the transportation cost τ.
Right panel. Long run stationary distribution of the entry exit process simulated in the left
panel. In both panels the parameters are σ = 4, α = 1, µ = 0.5 and I = 800.
take over. This behavior is well in accordance with the bimodal nature of the equilibrium
distribution (c.f. right panel of Fig. 2). In fact, the equilibrium distribution represents the
unconditional probability of  nding the system in a give state. This probability can thus be
very di erent from the frequency with which this particular state is observed over a  nite time
window.
Conversely, for higher transportation costs (τ = 0.7), agglomeration is “almost” never
observed:  rms spatial distribution is now  uctuating around x∗ = 0.5 (c.f. left panel of
Fig. 2). Even if the static analysis predicts agglomeration, the equilibrium distribution of the
stochastic system, reported in the right panel of Fig. 2, shows that the most likely geographical
distribution has an equal number of  rms per location, irrespectively of the fact that the point
x∗ = 0.5 is never a static geographical equilibrium. In general one has the following
Proposition 4.3. Consider the entry and exit process described in Proposition 4.2. When the
marginal pro t is bigger than the intrinsic pro t, b > a, the stationary distribution (4.5) is
bimodal with modes in x = 0 and x = 1, when b < a the stationary distribution is unimodal
with mode in x = 0.5, and when a = b the stationary distribution is uniform.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given our dynamic locational decision process, the previous proposition clari es that the
shape of the geographical equilibrium distribution does ultimately depend on the relative size
of the marginal pro t b and the intrinsic pro t a. When marginal pro ts are bigger than
intrinsic pro ts the distribution has mass on the borders of the [0,1] interval. When marginal
pro ts are lower than intrinsic pro ts the distribution has higher mass in the middle of this
interval, and when they are equal every value of the geographical distribution is as likely.
Rewriting the relation b ≷ a in Proposition 4.3 using the de nitions of a and b in (4.4), it
is straightforward to derive the conditions for the unimodality or bimodality of (4.5) in terms
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Figure 3: Entry exit process for di erent values of the number of residents I. Left panel.
A portion of the space (I,τ) has been divided into the “agglomeration” area (white) and
the “equidistribution” area (shaded) according to Proposition 4.3. Right panel. Stationary
geographical distributions computed at the points A, B, and C. Other parameters are α = 1,
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Figure 4: Entry exit process for di erent values of the  xed costs α. Left panel. A portion
of the space (α,τ) has been divided into the “agglomeration” area (white) and the “equidis 
tribution” area (shaded) according to Proposition 4.3. Right panel. Stationary geographical
distributions computed at the points A, B, and C. Other parameters are I = 400, µ = 0.5
and σ = 4 whereas N is  xed by Ass. 4.
The left panels of Figs. 3 and 4 have been obtained using the latter inequality: they show
which distributional shape is observed in the di erent regions of the plane (I,τ) and (α,τ)
respectively. In the white area agglomeration is most likely (bimodal distribution), whereas
in the dark area equidistribution is most likely (unimodal distribution). In the right panels
the stationary distributions computed at the corresponding points A, B, and C are shown. In
both  gures these points have been obtained by keeping τ  xed.
The right panel of Fig. 3 shows that moving from small to large values of I while keeping τ
 xed, the long run distribution changes from bimodal to unimodal. This is due to the fact that
an increase of the number of residents I leads to a decrease of the marginal pro t b (c.f. (4.4)).
In fact, due to Assumption 4, the more the residents, the more the  rms and the smaller the
contribution of each  rm locational decision to the pro ts of other  rms, that is, the smaller
15the marginal pro t. Changing I corresponds to a sort of “size” e ect: increasing the size of
the economy lowers the externalities so that, due to the entry exit process, the likelihood to
observe agglomeration is lowered.
The right panel of Fig. 3 shows that, keeping τ  xed, an increase in the  xed cost parameter
α leads, in general, to more agglomerated economies. It is so because an increase in α decreases
the intrinsic pro t a while increasing the marginal pro t b. More precisely, α determines the
scale of the pro t di erentials. Indeed, on the one hand, the di erence between the maximum
and the minimum pro t is proportional to α and, on the other hand, because of Assumption 4,
the higher α the lower N, so that a bigger pro t di erence is caused by a lower number of
 rms. As a result, increasing  xed costs decreases the pro t each  rm earns irrespectively of
the presence of other  rms, and increases the e ect of each locational choice on the pro ts
of others. Both e ects go in the direction of increasing the likelihood of agglomeration. This
is a sort of “scale” e ect where increasing the scale of pro ts increases the likelihood of
agglomeration.
Concerning the e ect of the transportation cost on the shape of the equilibrium distribu 
tion, notice that the expression τσ−1/(1+τσ−1)2, which appears in (4.4) for both a and b, but
with a di erent sign, is an increasing function of τ. Thus, increasing the value of τ leads to an
increase of the marginal pro t b and to a decrease of the intrinsic pro t a. This means that
low transportation costs, that is, high values of τ, favor agglomeration, while high transporta 
tion costs favor equidistribution. Indeed, when transportation costs are low, the pecuniary
externality is relatively weak and the technological externality relatively strong. In terms of
the entry exit process, the choice of a  rm to relocate its activity has an high impact on the
level of pro ts. Consequently, it is likely to trigger other relocations and, eventually, a strong
agglomeration is observed. Conversely, when transportation costs are high, the pecuniary and
technological externalities almost o set each other. This implies that marginal pro ts are
small and intrinsic pro ts dominate, so that each locational choice has a very small impact
on the general level of pro ts. The attracting force of each location does not depend on the
externality term and, given the symmetry of the two locations, equidistribution is likely to be
observed.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a model of  rms location in geographical space where  rms interact both
indirectly, through market interactions, and directly, through technological externalities, and
where workers are not mobile. In this simple framework we have brie y discussed the general
equilibrium static case, identifying the possible geographical equilibria, that is, the spatial
distributions in which  rms do not have any incentive to relocate their activities. We have
showed that in this case the “cost sharing” assumption implies long run agglomeration, ir 
respectively of the number of consumers, their preferences, and transportation costs. Then
we have extended the analysis including heterogeneity in  rms preferences and an explicit
time dynamics in their choices thus obtaining a stochastic model of  rms dynamics. We have
been able to characterize the long run geographical distribution of the process for di erent
speci cations of the economy. This analysis has revealed that, contrary to the static equilib 
rium analysis, when an explicit entry exit dynamics is assumed to characterize the locational
decision of  rms, the economy can evolve towards two di erent long run scenarios. In the  rst
scenario, where externalities are stronger than intrinsic location pro ts, which typically occurs
for low transportation costs, the long run geographical distribution is bimodal with modes at
16the extremal outcomes x = 0 and x = 1. Agglomeration is thus the most likely event but, as
simulations show, this does not mean that once agglomeration on one side has been achieved,
the situation is stable. In fact, turning points exist where the mass of  rms moves from one lo 
cation to the other. In the second scenario the long run geographical distribution has a unique
mode. In this case, the most likely occurrence is having half of the  rms located in one region
and the other half in the other region. However, due to the stochastic nature of the process,
 uctuations around this average level are present. This scenario is typically associated with
high transportation costs, and occurs, in general, when the e ect of externalities is weak with
respect to the intrinsic pro t levels of each location.
Summarizing, the main contribution of the foregoing analysis is to show how  rms hetero 
geneity and an individual choice process act as breaks or constraints to  rms agglomeration,
even when strong incentives to locate in already populous locations exist. Moreover, having
introduced an explicit time dimension, we have given history a role. Indeed the time dimension
matters in two respects:  rst, the initial distribution of activities across two locations does
in uence the subsequent observed distributions and, second, when agglomeration is observed,
due to stochastic  uctuations, it is only a metastable phenomenon. That is, by waiting long
enough, the cluster eventually disappears just to be soon recreated, with probability 1/2, in
the other location.
Our model can be extended in several directions. First of all, the “cost sharing” assumption,
while useful, is admittedly ad hoc. A more careful modeling is probably needed. The e ort
should not be restricted to the notion of technological and/or knowledge spillover, which
might even be characterized by a pecuniary nature, see e.g. Antonelli (2008), but could
encompass also other, possible negative, sources of not market mediated interactions, like
pollution and/or congestion e ects. A second extension of the model would be to generalize
consumers behavior along the same lines we followed to describe  rms behavior. Whereas in
the present version of the model consumers are homogeneous and maximize the same CES
utility function, it would be interesting to assume that consumers are heterogeneous and to
explicitly model their consumption decision in time. In that case, changing the size of the
economy would imply, due to varying idiosyncrasies in consumers demand, a change in the
amplitude of pro ts  uctuations. This, in turn, would impact the likelihood of observing
agglomerated outcomes, probably reducing it.
In any case, we are aware that the ultimate test bed will be to confront our model with real
data. An interesting aspect of the discrete choice model we implemented is that it leads quite
easily to empirical applications. An exercise in this direction has already been performed
in Bottazzi et al. (2008) where the parameters characterizing the geographical equilibrium
distribution have been estimated in several sectors of the Italian manufacturing industry. The
present work moves in the direction of developing a theoretical framework able to provide
deeper and more informative economic interpretations of these econometric exercises.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.1 Average pro ts follow in a straightforward
way by computing   π = xπ1(x)+ (1−x)π2(x) with π1(x) and π2(x) as in (2.12) and in (2.17).










17Proof of Proposition 3.1 First, the unique  rms distribution where pro ts are equal is
x = 0.5. Indeed taking pro ts as in (2.17), setting π1(x) equal to π2(x) gives a  rst order
equation in x whose unique solution is x = 0.5.
Geographical equilibria are Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE) of the one stage game
where each  rm in a group of N (N even), has to choose to be located in l = 1 or l = 2 and
pro ts are given by (2.17). Denote  rm i = 1,...,N strategy as si. Firm i can choose to
locate either in 1, si = 1, or in 2, si = 0. The strategy space has thus 2N elements. A strategy







To complete the formalization of the game we have to specify each  rm payo  for any strategy
pro le s. When si = 1,  rm i payo  πi is given by
πi(1,s−i) ≡ π1(x(s)),
where π1(x) is as in (2.17) and x(s) is de ned above. When si = 0,  rm i payo  is
πi(0,s−i) ≡ π2(x(s)),
where π2(x) is again from (2.17). To give an example, if all  rms are choosing location l = 1,
so that x = 1, one has πi = π1(1) for all i = 1,...,N. If, instead, half of the  rms are located
in l = 1 and the other half in l = 2, so that x = 0.5, one has πi = π1(0.5) if si = 1 and







−i) for all si = 0,1 , i = 1,...,N . (A.1)
The only candidates to be PSNE are those strategy pro les s for which x(s) ∈ {0,1,0.5}. We
start by showing that every s∗ such that x(s∗) = 1 or x(s∗) = 0 is a PSNE pro le. From (2.17)
it holds that π1(1) > π2(x) for all x ∈ [0,1) and π2(0) > π1(x) for all x ∈ (0,1], so that (A.1)
is satis ed. Then consider a strategy pro le s∗ such that x(s∗) = x∗ = 0.5. Given (A.1), it is














∀i = 1,...,N. (A.3)
Since the two locations are identical and x is the share of  rms choosing location 1, by









The latter is satis ed if and only if the function π1(x) is not increasing at x = 0.5. Direct
computation of dπ1(x)/dx|x=0.5 (see the following proofs for the explicit expression) shows
that this is the never the case, implying that the symmetric distribution is never a PSNE.
18Proof of Proposition 4.2 Consider the Taylor expansion up to the  rst order of each term
in (2.17) as a function of z = x − 0.5











2), l = 1,2.
Using the expressions above to linearize expπl in (4.2), and writing them in terms of the
number of  rms nl, l = 1,2 we obtain the expressions of the linearized exponential payo  cl,
c1 = 1 − 2α
 
(1 − tσ−1)2








c2 = 1 + 2α
 
(1 − tσ−1)2









This shows that a and b are given by
a = 1 + α
 
(1 − tσ−1)2







(1 + tσ−1)2 − 1
 
,
which, using Assumption 4 to eliminate N, correspond to (4.4).
Proof of Proposition 4.3 From (4.5) it follows that the distribution is symmetric around
N/2, that is π(N/2 + n) = π(N/2 − n) for every n = 0,...,N/2. Consequently it su ces to
analyse the set {0,...,N/2}.


















a(a + b)...(a + b(N − 1)) ≷ Na
2(a + b)...(a + b(N − 2))
b ≷ a. (A.4)
Second consider









(n + 1)a(a + b)...(a + b(n − 1))a(a + b)...(a + b(N − n − 1)) ≷
≷ (n + 1)a(a + b)...(a + bn)a(a + b)...(a + b(N − n − 2))
b(N − 2n − 1) ≷ B(N − 2n − 1)
b ≷ a, (A.5)
where the last step requires n ≤ N/2−1, which is our case. From A.4 and A.5 it follows that
when b > a the maximum is in π(0) (and by symmetry in π(N)), whereas, when b < a, the
maximum is in π(N/2).
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